May I confirm what the Chairman of the Select Committee has just said? Mr Barnier said to us in Brussels yesterday that the Chequers proposal fundamentally undermines the single market and is unacceptable. He went on to say, however, that he was keen to negotiate a free trade agreement, with associated agreements in the other areas that the Secretary of State has described. Is not it now time, therefore, to abandon the flawed proposal that is not going to work, and instead try to achieve an agreement that delivers Brexit and preserves the fullest level of co-operation?

 

I always listen very carefully to my right hon. Friend’s advice. I do not think that, having presented our proposals, we are going to roll over for Brussels. We are going to explain them to Michel Barnier and answer the questions, practical and others, he has raised. We are confident that our proposals respect the key and core equities and core principles of the EU, but also resolve all the issues we need to see resolved around frictionless trade at the border, critically, in terms of our future relationship, avoiding any need for recourse to the Irish backstop.

Does my right hon. Friend agree that the financial settlement contained in the withdrawal agreement is one of our strongest bargaining cards? Will he therefore include in the Bill provisions to ensure that its full payment is conditional on our achieving a satisfactory outcome to negotiations?

 

As ever, my right hon. Friend makes a powerful point, and as the EU says, there is no deal until the whole deal is concluded. The withdrawal agreement must come alongside a framework for the future partnership agreement—article 50 requires that—and if one party does not meet its side of the bargain, that will inevitably have consequences for the deal as a whole.

 

I begin by warmly congratulating my hon. Friend the Member for The Wrekin (Mark Pritchard) on securing this debate, which covers a matter of considerable concern, both in this country and across Europe. I think we saw evidence of that yesterday, when the Prime Minister gave her statement following the NATO summit. In the questions that followed, five hon. Members raised the issue of Nord Stream 2 and expressed concern about its consequences.

 

That concern has been echoed in Governments across Europe. My hon. Friend said that he had spoken to the President of Latvia, the former President of Poland and to Italy. As he knows, I chair the all-party parliamentary groups on Ukraine, Moldova, Lithuania and Belarus, and when the Moldovan and Lithuanian Foreign Ministers visited London they raised Nord Stream 2 as a specific concern and potential threat to the security of their countries. Last week at the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly in Berlin, I participated in a meeting organised by the Ukrainian delegation to highlight many of the points that my hon. Friend made so forcefully.

 

When my right hon. Friend the Minister has discussed Nord Stream 2 in the past—I have raised it with him—he has suggested that it is primarily a commercial matter and, because the UK is at the far end of a long pipeline, it is of less concern to us. However, I hope he will recognise the security implications that we must take seriously. First, is this a commercial matter? It is hard to see any commercial justification for the massive investment that Nord Stream 2 will require. The existing pipeline, which crosses through Ukraine, does a pretty good job. It is highly flexible, allowing fluctuations in gas pressure, and it has spare capacity. It may need some investment to bring it up to modern standards, and that could cost an estimated $100 to $300 million a year.

 

On a recent trip to Brussels, I spoke to the Commission about its plans for a net-zero target, which would bring a significant reduction in gas demand across north-western Europe. One would think that that would revise yet further the commercial case for a new pipeline such as Nord Stream 2.

 

My hon. Friend makes a good point. The more one looks at the economic case for the investment, the harder it is to see. The cost of building Nord Stream 2 is estimated at $17 billion, and it will not add to capacity as there is spare capacity in the existing pipeline. Ukraine moved about 94 billion cubic metres of gas last year, which left 55 billion cubic metres of spare capacity. It difficult to see any significant increase in demand—in actual fact, as he points out, there may well be a reduction.

 

The commercial justification simply does not add up. In a recent analysis of the economics, Sberbank said, “The Power of Siberia”—another gas pipeline—

 

“Nord Stream-2 and Turkish Stream are all deeply value-destructive projects that will eat up almost half of Gazprom’s investments over the next five years. They are commonly perceived as being foisted on the company by the government pursuing a geopolitical agenda.”

 

We are extremely familiar with the idea that Gazprom is used by the Russian Government as an instrument to deliver their political objectives. In the last decade or so, we have seen the Russian Government use gas as a weapon on numerous occasions—particularly in 2009 and 2014—either reducing the amount or, in some cases, cutting off supply altogether.

 

The Russians use gas because they have the overwhelming supply for most of Europe, and they do not hesitate to deploy it as a political weapon. The new chairman of the Ukrainian gas company Naftogaz, Clare Spottiswoode, will be familiar to many of us here, as for a long time she was the regulator for energy markets in the UK. She did a fantastic job in the UK of fostering competition among gas suppliers, because she believes, as I do, that the way to provide the best service to consumers is by increasing competition, yet she points out that Nord Stream 2 will have a detrimental effect on competition. It is anti-competitive and it will increase the monopolistic stranglehold of Gazprom, and behind it the Russian Federation.

 

As my hon. Friend the Member for The Wrekin pointed out, Nord Stream 2 is essentially a political tool. The Polish Prime Minister has described it as a new hybrid weapon. If it replaces the Ukrainian gas pipeline—I think all of us believe that is the long-term objective—the consequence will be for Ukraine to lose up to 4% of its GDP, with an effect on government spending of a cut of about $2.3 billion. This is an economy that is already suffering, with Ukraine having part of its territory under occupation, notably its manufacturing heart in the east. The loss of the pipeline would be a further economic blow to a country that is already finding things difficult.

 

The consequences for Ukraine, however, are not only economic. The building of Nord Stream 2 and Europe no longer having to rely on Ukraine as a transit country for its supply of gas would remove one of the critical obstacles that stands in the way of further Russian aggression against Ukraine. The need to preserve the existing pipeline has to some extent acted as a disincentive to Russia; removing that disincentive could allow it to increase its military aggression against Ukraine.

 

As my hon. Friend said, Germany is phasing out nuclear power and, in all likelihood, we shall if anything increase our dependence on Russian gas, and yet at the same time we are engaged in hybrid warfare, as has been pointed out in debates in Parliament on a number of occasions: Russia occupies a part of Ukraine in the Crimean peninsula; it supports separatist movements in eastern Ukraine; it interferes in elections, in particular in the United States and in France; it runs a disinformation campaign through black propaganda; and of course our Government hold it responsible for the murder of a British citizen on UK soil and for the attempted murder of several others. This is not the time to make ourselves more vulnerable to Russian pressure by allowing Russia to increase its stranglehold on gas supply into Europe.

 

I therefore very much agree with my hon. Friend, and I congratulate him. I hope that the Minister will express—perhaps in stronger terms than we have heard before now—the concerns that exist in the British Government should that project go ahead.

I welcome my right hon. Friend’s support for Ukraine and the recognition of the potential threat of Nord Stream 2. Will she confirm that there is absolutely no question of any NATO member country recognising the illegal annexation of the Crimean peninsula by the Russian Federation?

 

We are very clear—as was, I think, everybody around that table—that an illegal annexation took place. Significant support was shown for Ukraine around that table. There are of course requirements on Ukraine and Georgia for their potential future membership of NATO, but we look forward to working with them to help them to meet those requirements.

 

I do not want to detain the Committee; I just have one question for the Minister and one area in which I seek reassurance. My question refers to the explanatory note, which says that one of the purposes of this instrument is to

 

“reflect changes to strengthen protection for juvenile covert human intelligence sources”.

 

To me, that sounds like under-age spies. Could the Minister say in what circumstances we might be using juvenile covert human intelligence sources, unless my interpretation is wrong?

 

Like many in my party—including the Minister, I am sure—I regard the restriction on civil liberties represented by investigatory powers or electronic surveillance as necessary when it comes to national security matters and organised crime. As we have seen in the past, however, the list of agencies with access to those powers is considerable. It is difficult to imagine why the General Pharmaceutical Council, for example, might need them. The double lock provision offers some reassurance, but I would like the Minister to assure me that agencies not obviously in the frontline of the battle against terrorism or organised crime, such as some of those listed, are likely to use these powers only on extremely limited occasions.

 

I am grateful to all parties here for their support, in principle, for these guidelines. As I said at the beginning, they are designed to reflect changes—for example, in the areas around oversight. The three commissioners have been folded into the judicial commissioners—the Investigatory Powers Commissioner— and that needs to be reflected. They are also designed to reflect changes in technique since RIPA was introduced. Equipment interference used often to be included under property interference, but is now a technical capability—how the law enforcement agencies and intelligence services can access information within an electronic device. To some extent and in some examples they would use equipment interference, so that is only right and proper.

 

On the increasing safeguards, I specifically changed the guidance to increase the onus on journalistic protections, to ensure that that is properly reflected. There are now whole sections of the guidance that relate to what a police officer or a user using these powers has to follow. I think that was important.

 

On the subject of juvenile CHIS, it is regrettable that there are young people, below the age of 18 and even 16, who are engaged in criminality, sometimes with gangs; we see it more in county lines, as well. On some very rare occasions, with the authority of the parent, guardian, social worker or other person, we can authorise young people to be part of a process where they can share information, or indeed be tasked. It is not some sort of Alex Rider, secret agent or 007 scenario—my children and I enjoy those books on long car journeys—but a sad reflection of how criminality is working.

 

We wanted to change the operational impact. At the moment, under RIPA, there is authorisation for one month at a time. We said that that was leading to a stop-start situation and we needed a four-month period—with oversight, obviously. We wanted to slightly broaden who could give the authority, because the guardian or other individual might be engaged in the abuse or the problems that the young people might be tasked with. That is simply a reflection of our trying to ensure that we provide a broader number of people who can safeguard it and extend the time so that we can have an operational impact.

 

I am happy to write to my right hon. Friend the Member for Maldon about the extension in who can use some of the powers—he referred to the General Pharmaceutical Council—and explain why that is necessary.

 

The hon. Member for Paisley and Renfrewshire North and I might have a slightly different opinion of the ruling that he mentioned. Yes, the European Court of Justice ruled that the Data Retention and Investigatory Powers Act 2014 did not provide for enough independent authorisation. That is why we conceded that in court—I will grant him that. However, the broader stuff on our regime being indiscriminate, and on required notification, was not agreed with, and the UK Government’s case was upheld by the Court. The regime was proportionate and necessary, and recognised the reality of how some of this has to be dealt with.

 

I can give all colleagues confidence that the judicial commissioners are formidable, independent individuals. Lord Justice Fulford and his judicial commissioners are all senior or retired judges. I promise the Committee that they will not be a pushover. I have met them a considerable number of times; as members of the judiciary, they are not shy about asking when they think something is wrong.

 

We should be proud of where we have ended up. I would not like to see any further erosion of the balance that we have, which is a gentle one. I think Liberty is before the court at the moment trying to prevent us even from having communications data; we would not then even be able to find out about someone’s telephone when they were arrested. That would, in my view, be unacceptable and put the public at huge risk. It is time for some people to put aside their purity and realise that this is a balance between our constituents’ rights to life and to privacy. I think we have got the balance just about right. That is why I am very grateful for all parties’ support for tonight’s measures.

 

The guidelines are there to be used by the people using the powers. If they follow them and the judicial oversight, we will be in a better place—one where our rights are protected, but our law enforcement and intelligence services can get on and do the job of keeping us safe.

 

Question put and agreed to.

Is my right hon. Friend aware of the chorus of complaints from countries such as Moldova, Ukraine and Georgia, where businessmen who want to come to do trade deals with us—indeed, in some cases Members of Parliament or Government Ministers from those countries—are facing lengthy delays in obtaining visas, and in some cases outright refusal? Will she have another look at the issue? It is doing real damage to our relations with those countries.

 

UKVI issues 2.7 million visas every single year and, as I said, the vast majority are done within our service standards. I am happy to look into my right hon. Friend’s point, because in a Britain that is outward-looking, global and open for business, it is important that visas are issued efficiently.

I welcome my right hon. Friend’s statement. Will he confirm that taking back control of our waters will allow us to design a fisheries policies that will be beneficial not just to the commercial fishing industry, but to recreational sea anglers, and will he bear their interests in mind?

 

My right hon. Friend makes a very good point. Indeed, the White Paper explains how angling, which is a hugely important part of the life of the nation, can benefit from the additional opportunities that accrue as a result of life outside the European Union. He is absolutely right to underline that, and we look forward to responses obviously not just from the fishing industry, but from recreational and other anglers as well.

  • I welcome the Government’s multi-pronged approach, but will the Minister bear in mind the fact that, when it comes to calls for banning advertising before 9 o’clock, such a measure would do huge damage to the economics of the commercial broadcasters, just at a time when fewer and fewer young people are watching scheduled television? Instead, they are now watching the on-demand services that are the direct competitors of commercial TV stations.

     
     
  • I take my right hon. Friend’s views very seriously, but we want to protect children from the advertising of products that are high in saturated fat, salt and sugar, and we are going to consult on introducing a 9 pm watershed. He mentions online, catch-up and social media, and that is one of the reasons that this is an important area for us to consult on. We want to ensure that we get this right, and it is not about punishing the industry. The people who work in the industry and in advertising are also parents, members of society and taxpayers. They also have a stake in this and in the reason for it all to succeed.

  • Will my right hon. Friend join me in welcoming the Speaker of the Ukrainian Parliament, Mr Andriy Parubiy, to Westminster—although I suspect that he is utterly mystified by the events that took place 10 minutes ago? Will she take this opportunity to reaffirm the support of the UK for Ukraine, which is in the frontline against Russian aggression? Does she share the concern of Ukraine, along with Lithuania and Poland, about the strategic threat of the Nord Stream 2 Russian gas pipeline?

     
     
  • I am very happy to reaffirm the United Kingdom’s commitment to and support for Ukraine. Only a matter of weeks ago, I was pleased to be able to have a further conversation with President Poroshenko about the support that we are able to give to Ukraine, and about the work we are doing with Ukraine on the reforms that are being put through. Also, as I mentioned in response to a previous question, it is important that the European Union should maintain the sanctions on Russia, because the Minsk agreements have not been put in place and fully implemented. We need to continue to show the Russians that we do not accept what they have done in Ukraine.